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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

;
Appeal No. 20070187-CA

GEORGE LARSEN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
UTAH CODE ANN.

§77-18a-l(l)(a) (2003) and UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE

PROCEDURE 3(a) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal from the Judgment
entered on February 2,2007 (the "Judgment"), by the Seventh Judicial District Court in and
for San Juan County, State of Utah, in this case involving Criminal Mischief, a Class B
Misdemeanor; Criminal Trespass, a Class B Misdemeanor; and Disorderly Conduct, a Class
C Misdemeanor.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE I:

Was the evidence presented sufficient to sustain the conviction of
Criminal Mischief?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim "is highly deferential to a jury verdict." State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66,f 29,
122 P.3d 639. "[This Court] begin[s] by reviewing 'the evidence and all inferences
which may be reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict.'"
Id. (citations omitted). "[This Court] will reverse a jury verdict for insufficient
evidence only if [it] determine[s] that 'reasonable minds could not have reached the
verdict.'" Id. (citations omitted). Stated another way, "[this Court] will reverse a jury
verdict only when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in
a light most favorable to the verdict, [it] find[s] that the evidence to support the
verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the
verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v. Lopez. 2001 UT App 123,^[ 10, 24
P.3d993.
ISSUE II:

Was the evidence presented sufficient to sustain the conviction of
Criminal Trespass?

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The standard of review for a sufficiency of the

evidence claim "is highly deferential to a jury verdict." State v. Workman, 2005 UT
66,f 29, 122 P.3d 639. "[This Court] begin[s] by reviewing 'the evidence and all
inferences which may be reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to the
verdict.'" Id. (citations omitted). "[This Court] will reverse a jury verdict for
insufficient evidence only if [it] determine[s] that 'reasonable minds could not have
reached the verdict.'" Id. (citations omitted). Stated another way, "[this Court] will
reverse a jury verdict only when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn
2

therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, [it] find[s] that the evidence to
support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to
make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v. Lopez, 2001 UT App
123,1fl0,24P.3d993.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A.

UNITED STATES CONST. AMEND. V

B.

UTAH CONST. ART. I, § 7

C.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§76-6-106

D.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§76-6-206

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 27, 2007, George Larsen ("Larsen") was charged by Information in
the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Grand County with being a Restricted Person
in Possession of Dangerous Weapon, a class A Misdemeanor; Criminal Mischief, a class B
Misdemeanor; Criminal Trespass, a class B Misdemeanor; and Disorderly Conduct, a class
C Misdemeanor. R001,R002.
A bench trial was held on January 23, 2007, at which time Larsen was found guilty
of Criminal Mischief, Criminal Trespass, and Disorderly Conduct. R040- R041. Larsen was
found not guilty of being a Restricted Person in Possession of a Dangerous Weapon. Id. On
February 2,2007, the trial court entered its Judgment sentencing Larsen to two (2) terms of
six (6) months in the Grand County Jail to be served concurrently on the convictions of
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Criminal Mischief and Criminal Trespass and ninety (90) days in the Grand County Jail to
be served consecutively on the Disorderly Conduct conviction. R0043-R0044.
On February 22, 2007, Larsen filed his Notice of Appeal R0055. On February 23,
2007, Larsen filed his Amended Notice of Appeal. R0062.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

State's Witness Tamela Hudyma's Testimony

Tamela Hudyma ("Hudyma") testified that she lives at 610 Cane Creek Boulevard,
#85, and was living there on November 15th, 2006. Tr. at p. 6. Hudyma testified that on said
date, though she had been given a No-contact Order from Judge Manley prohibiting her from
contacting George Larsen ("Larsen"), Larsen came to the door. Id. Hudyma testified that
she understood she could not have contact with Larsen so she called the police. Id.
Hudyma testified that when Larsen came to the door, she was talking to her daughter
on the phone. Tr. at p. 7. Hudyma testified that she told her daughter that Larsen was at the
door, so she would have to hang up and call the police department. Id. Hudyma testified that
she did not remember whether Larsen had banged, knocked, or yelled to alert her that he was
at the door, but she knew it was Larsen when she saw him through the peephole. Id.
Hudyma testified that she called the police and then Larsen pushed in the door and
threw down a card. Tr. at p. 8. Hudyma testified that the door had been previously damaged,
and that it was further damaged by Larsen when he pushed it in. Id. Hudyma testified that
she then heard somebody on the stairs, and Larsen came back up and she told him that she
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had the No-Contact Order and that she had called the police department. Id. Hudyma
testified that Larsen wanted to talk to her, that at one point he said that he was going to go
downstairs and wait for the officers to show up, but that the officers showed up before he
went back downstairs. Tr. at p. 9.
Hudyma testified that when the officers showed up, she and Larsen were in her
bathroom. Id. Hudyma testified that ever since she suffered a head injury, whenever she
doesn't know what to do, she goes into the bathroom for some reason. Id. Hudyma testified
that she did not recall any yelling and screaming between her and Larsen when the officers
arrived. Id. Upon being shown the State's Exhibit No. 1, a series of photographs, Hudyma
testified that Larsen had broken the lock that night as well as the tape that she had previously
applied to the door to prevent it from separating due to prior damage. Tr. at p. 10.
Hudyma testified that she got a protective order the next day. Id. Hudyma testified
that though she was not afraid of Larsen, she was fearful of what Larsen might do next in his
desperation of wanting to talk to her. Id. Hudyma testified that she thought it was best to
get a protective order because she continued to get in trouble. Id. Hudyma testified that she
had not necessarily stated in the protective order that she was afraid. Tr. at p. 11. Hudyma
testified that she obtained the protective order because she thought it would eliminate any
confusion as to who could talk to who and when. Id. Hudyma testified that the State's
Exhibit No. 2 was her protective order, that she had made the statement therein, and that she
had sworn to it. Tr. at pp. 12, 14. After reading the protective order silently to herself,
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Hudyma testified that reading it had refreshed her memory, and that, as the protective order
said, she had been fearful for herself and for Larsen because she did not want either of them
to get into any further trouble for trying to talk to the other. Tr. at pp. 12-13. Hudyma
testified that she was afraid of what might happen in the future if this was not resolved. Tr.
at p. 13.
Hudyma testified that Paragraph (F) of the Protective Order was her sworn statement
on the day she obtained said order. Tr. at p. 14. Hudyma testified that when Larsen came
through her door she was afraid. Tr. at p. 15. Hudyma read the following statement from
her protective order: "Breaking in my door makes me fearful for myself, and also for him,
for I do not know what will happen next." Id. Hudyma testified that she has had her door
repaired since the night Larsen broke it, and that the repairs had cost two-hundred sixty
dollars ($260.00). Hudyma testified that the door that was broken belonged to her and not to
Larsen. Id.
Hudyma testified that she is involved in a proceeding in juvenile court with the
Division of Child and Family Services ("DCFS"), and that prior to the night in question with
Larsen, her child had been removed from her custody. Tr. at p. 16. Hudyma testified that
she had been required to do a urinalysis at the courthouse which came up initially as a
positive, but that she found out a week and a half later that it was found by the lab to be a
false positive. Tr. at pp. 16-17. Hudyma testified that the juvenile court judge, Judge
Manley, was uncomfortable with Hudyma being in Larsen's presence and with her daughter
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being exposed to Larsen because the judge believed Larsen had a prior drug history. Tr. at
p. 17. Hudyma testified that, to her knowledge, Judge Manley's discomfort with her being
around Larsen or with her daughter being exposed to Larsen had nothing to do with any
feeling that Larsen was a danger to Hudyma or a physical danger to her or her daughter. Id.
Hudyma testified that the Order removing her daughter from her included the No-Contact
Order restraining her from having any contact with Larsen. Tr. at p. 17-18. Hudyma testified
that by stating that she was "afraid" meant she knew the situation was bad and did not want
the situation with the No-contact Orders or with DCFS getting worse. Tr. at pp. 18-19.
Hudyma testified that she was not afraid that her own physical safety would get worse. Id.
Hudyma testified that Larsen had never lived in her home, but that she had lived with
him in his home. Tr. at p. 19. Hudyma testified that the last time that she and Larsen had
lived together was in February of 2006. Id. Hudyma testified that Larsen still had some of
his personal possessions in her home, including his fish tank and a pet Bearded Dragon that
was originally supposed to belong to Hudyma's daughter, and for which they had all
contributed funds. Id. Hudyma testified that Larsen had kept some of his movies as well as
some of his clothes in her home at times when she was doing his laundry. Tr. at p. 20.
Hudyma testified that Larsen had occasionally spent the night at her home in the past, but,
more often, she would go to his house to spend the night. Id. Hudyma testified that at one
time Larsen had a key to her home, but that on the night in question he did not have a key,
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however, she testified that she had problems with the locks and nobody used a key. Tr. at
p. 20-21.
Hudyma testified that her door had been cracked prior to the night in question. Tr. at
p. 21. Hudyma testified that she thought, because of the door's splitting, that the door was
hollow with a wooden core and a metal shell, and would swell in the summer causing it to
stick. Id. Hudyma testified that the photos of the door in State's Exhibit No. 1 showed both
the damage that had occurred prior to the night in question, as well as the damage done by
Larsen. Id. Hudyma testified that the door had been taped because of the crack in the
swelling. Id. Hudyma testified that she did not know if the police had removed the tape
prior to taking the picture. Tr. at p. 21 -22. Hudyma testified that there was still tape on the
door when she came out of the bathroom after the police arrived. Tr. at p. 22. Hudyma
testified that said tape was visible in the photographs in State's Exhibit No. 1, and that she
did not know whether any tape had been removed. Id.
Hudyma testified that she did not see Larsen break the lock or kick in the door. Tr.
at p. 22-23. Hudyma testified that she did not see any boot prints on the door. Tr. at p. 23.
Hudyma testified that, other than the usual sounds of people going up and down the stairs,
she did not see or hear another individual with Larsen, though she had been told that there
was somebody else on the stairs. Id. Hudyma testified that somebody had come to the door,
and she looked through the peephole and that Larsen was there. Id. Hudyma testfied that she
did not recall stating that Larsen had come up with anyone. Tr. at p. 24.
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Hudyma testified that on the night of the incident, while what had occurred was still
fresh in her mind, she had made out a written statement. Tr. at p. 24-25. Hudyma testified
that she remembered hearing the wood crack on the front door as Larsen kicked in the door.
Tr. at p. 25. Hudyma testified that the statement presented to her in court by the State was
in fact the statement she had made and that, after reading it, her memory about what she had
heard that night was refreshed. Id. Hudyma testified that, while she was in the bathroom and
Larsen was at her door, she heard a crack that sounded like wood splitting. Tr. at p. 25-26.
Hudyma testified that she had not met in person with Detective Craig Shumway
("Shumway") about the incident, but that she had talked with him on the phone. Tr. at p.
26. Hudyma testified that she had told Shumway that the door had been damaged before the
incident, because of the sticking. Id. Hudyma testified that when Shumway had said that he
might need her to come in and make out another statement, she had told him she already had,
and he never got back to her. Id. Hudyma testified that she later received a subpoena. Id.
Hudyma testified that she did not want any misunderstandings and that she told Shumway
that she would not be pursuing the matter. Id.
Hudyma testified that her landlord had mentioned that she did not want Larsen on the
property. Tr. at p. 27. Hudyma testified that the Utah Department of Workforce Services
had helped her to get into her housing, and that she did not recall anyone from Workforce
Services, including an employee named Belinda, ever objecting to Larsen's presence on the
property or specifying whether any specific person could be there. Tr. at p. 27-28.
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B.

State's Witness Craig Shumway's Testimony

Shumway testified that he had been employed by the Moab City Police Department
for twelve (12) years. Tr. at p. 28-29. Shumway testified that he had wanted to talk to
Hudyma and made a phone call to her home on the afternoon of the 11th of January, 2007,
as well as going to her home and leaving a business card. Tr. at p. 29. Shumway testified
that Hudyma called him back and he asked her about the door. Id.
Shumway testified that, in their phone conversation, he told Hudyma that he had some
photographs he wanted her to see depicting the damage and asked her if the damage was
there prior to the night in question. Tr. at pp. 30, 31. Shumway testfied that Hudyma told
him on the phone that the damage was not there prior to the incident, but that the door had
been sticking. Id. Shumway testified that Hudyma told him there was nobody else with
Larsen the night of the incident. Tr. at p. 30. Shumway testified that he asked Hudyma if
she would make a written statement, and that she said she had made out a statement that night
and was not going to make out another statement. Id. Shumway testified that Hudyma told
him she did not want to pursue charges any longer. Tr. at pp. 30-31.
Shumway testified that he did not show Hudyma any of the pictures as his
conversation with Hudyma about the damage to the door had transpired over the phone. Tr.
at p. 31. Shumway reiterated his testimony that Hudyma had told him that the door was not
previously damaged, but that it had been sticking. Id.
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C.

State's Witness Officer Aaron Woodard's Testimony

Officer Aaron Woodard ("Woodard") testified that he is employed by Moab City
Police Department and has been in law enforcement for three (3) years. Tr. at p. 32.
Woodard testified that he was working on the evening of the 15th of November, 2006, and
responded to a call at approximately 7:00 pm to go to Hudyma's home. Tr. at p. 33.
Woodard testified that he was advised by Dispatch that there was a disturbance at Hudyma's
home, that Larsen was there, and that Hudyma had advised Dispatch that Larsen was not
supposed to be there due to a protective order. Id. Woodard testified that he and Deputy
Rogers ("Rogers") both showed up to Hudyma's residence at the same time. Id. Woodard
testified that he and Rogers were the very first two to arrive on the scene. Tr. at p. 38.
Woodard testified that when they came up the stairs they saw no one, but noticed that the
door that was damaged was open, and they announced who they were and went in. Tr. at p.
33-34. Woodard testified that they could hear arguing and that he recognized Larsen's voice,
which was agitated. Tr. at p. 34. Woodard testified that he then saw Larsen come around
the comer from the bathroom with Hudyma. Id. Woodard testified that they started
questioning Larsen in an effort to find out what was happening. Tr. at p. 35.
Woodard testified that Larsen said that he was there to drop off a letter. Id. Woodard
testified that Larsen told them it was the fault of law enforcement that the child was taken
out of the house and that he and Hudyma were having problems. Id. Woodard testified that
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he and Rogers asked Larsen to calm down due to his agitation, and to place his hands on the
wall. Id.
Woodard testified that he and Rogers feared because of Larsen's behavior that matters
could worsen. Id. Woodard testified that Larsen kept bringing his hands down, so they
placed him in handcuffs for their safety. Id. Woodard testified that, after Larsen was placed
in handcuffs, he was still very agitated and continued blaming them for what had taken place.
Id. Woodard testified that Hudyma was not considered agitated in a way that would
compromise her safety or well being, as far as he knew. Tr. at p. 39.
Woodard testified that he and Rogers did a clear pat-down on Larsen and upon doing
so they found a knife on Larsen's right hip in a leather scabbard. Tr. at p. 35. Woodard
testified that they confiscated the knife marked as State's Exhibit No. 4, and were concerned
about it because it was not the normal, pocket-size knife that would normally be in
someone's pocket. Tr. at p. 36. Woodard testified that the knife was a full-size knife, not
a folding knife, that he thought would be called a hunting knife, and that he did not believe
the scabbard it was in had a snap, and that he did not take the scabbard from Larsen. Tr. at
p. 39.
Woodard testified that he had Dispatch run a criminal history check on Larsen to see
if he would be someone who is restricted from carrying a weapon, and it was found on the
front page of the criminal history that Larsen had been convicted of felony. Tr. at p. 36-37.
Woodard testified that, after he took the knife from Larsen because of his agitation, they
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walked Larsen outside, placed him in the patrol car, and transported him to the sheriffs
office. Tr. at p. 37. Woodard testified that at the sheriffs office, after Larsen was turned
over to the booking staff, he was still very agitated, and that Woodard could see and hear him
in his cell yelling, banging on the walls, making a loud disturbance, and asking why they kept
doing this. Tr. at p. 37-38. Woodard testified that he did not take the photos attached to
State's Exhibit No. 1, nor was he there when the photos were taken because he had
transported Larsen to jail. Tr. at p. 39.
D.

State's Witness Zane Lammert's Testimony

Zane Lambert ("Lambert") testified that he was employed by the Grand County
Sheriffs Office, and that he had been in law enforcement for twelve (12) years. Tr. at p. 4041. Lambert testified that he was working on November 15th, 2006, and responded to a call
at Hudyma's apartment. Tr. at p. 41.
Lambert testified that this incident was the not the first to which he had responded at
that residence. Tr. at p. 45. Lambert testified that, since he did not think the city would have
a backup officer available for the incident and since the incident involved Larsen whose
demeanor was known to Lambert, he responded to the call to Hudyma's residence. Id.
Lambert testified that he believed he learned it was Larsen from Dispatch. Id. Lambert
testified that he did not know where Larsen lived, but that he had seen him there and at his
father's house. Tr. at pp. 45-46. Lambert testified that he is familiar with the location of her
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apartment, and that he arrived just a few minutes after the call. Tr. at p. 41. Lambert
testified that he was the last person who responded to the scene of the incident. Tr. at p. 44.
Lambert testified that upon arrival, he found Woodard and Rogers walking Larsen out
of the building and down the stairs in handcuffs. Tr. at pp. 41-42. Lambert testified that he
stood there while they walked by and then helped Woodard walk Larsen to the car, because
Larsen was not calm, but appeared angry and very upset about their presence. Tr. at pp. 4243. Lambert testified that Larsen was a little bit combative and was saying profanities
towards them. Tr. at p. 43. Lambert testified that he imagined that Larsen's profanity
towards him was in response to prior animosity rather than to something Lambert was doing
that night, and that Lambert had been to the residence during the prior summer because of
a problem with Larsen. Tr. at p. 46.
Lambert testified that he helped Larsen get seated in the car safely because he was
concerned with officer safety for Woodard. Tr, at p. 43. Lambert testified that he talked to
Woodard briefly and then Woodard took Larsen to jail. Id. Lambert testified that he went
back upstairs, obtained a statement from Hudyma, and took the pictures of the broken door
identified as State's Exhibit No. 1. Id. Lambert testified that the photographs fairly and
accurately represent what the door looked like on that night. Tr. at p. 44.
Lambert testified that Hudyma told him that Larsen had broken the door. Tr. at p. 43.
Lambert testified that Hudyma said that Larsen had knocked the door in once before, and had
torn the door off. Tr. at pp. 43-44. Lambert testified that the door had been repaired with
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tape. Id. Lambert testified that he did not know if the door had been altered by anyone or
if anyone had opened or shut the door or tried to manipulate it or do anything with it before
he arrived, or from the time that the officers arrived to the time that he had taken the
photographs. Tr. at pp. 44-45. Lambert testified that he did not touch the door or remove
any tape from the door. Tr. at p. 45. Lambert testified that when he arrived, the door was
the way it appeared in the photographs. Id.
E.

State's Witness Deputy Deston Rogers' Testimony

Deputy Deston Rogers ("Rogers") testified that he is employed by the Grand County
Sheriffs Office, and has been in law enforcement for four and one-half (4 14) years. Tr. at
pp. 46-47. Rogers testified that he was called to Hudyma's apartment at 610 Cane Creek,
Apartment A-5, on November 15th, 2006. Tr. at pp. 47-48. Rogers testified that he thought
he and Woodard were the first to arrive at the scene, and that he and Woodard arrived at
about the same time. Tr. at p. 48, 50-51. Rogers testified that when he arrived he went up
the stairwell to the apartment and could hear loud, argumentative voices inside the apartment.
Tr. at p. 48.
Rogers testified that, before they entered the apartment, they noticed that the door had
been damaged as if somebody had kicked and pushed it in. Tr. at p. 48, 51. Rogers testified
that the door lock, a dead bolt, had been "busted out." Tr. at p. 49, 51. Rogers testified that
the damage to the door appeared to be fresh. Tr. at p. 48. Rogers testified that there was
fresh wood laying on the carpet of the apartment. Tr. at p. 51.
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Rogers testified he did not know how much damage there had been to the door prior
to the incident. Tr. at p. 51. Rogers testified that there had been tape over the door and that
he could see where the crack had actually cracked the tape. Tr. at p. 49, 51. Rogers testified
that the photographs in State's Exhibit No. 1 were pictures of the damage to the door that he
had seen that night, and that the photos accurately reflected what he saw as he went through
the door that night. Tr. at p. 49.
Rogers testified that, after they heard yelling and had gone through the broken door,
they identified themselves as law enforcement. Id. Rogers testified that Larsen and Hudyma
came out of the bathroom area, and that Larsen seemed very irritated that law enforcement
was there. Id. Rogers testified that, while Woodard remained with Larsen, he followed
Hudyma back into the bathroom to talk to her and find out what was going on. Id.
Larsen testified that Hudyma said that she had been in the bathroom and heard the
door pop. Id. Rogers testified that after he talked to Hudyma, they went back out and he
talked to Larsen, who was irate. Tr. at p. 50.
Rogers testified that they became concerned for the safety of the officers and
instructed Larsen a couple of times to put his hands up on the wall. Id. Rogers testified that
Larsen refused to comply several times, so they decided to place him into handcuffs for
safety reasons until they could keep the situation under control. Id. Rogers testified that at
that point, they learned from Hudyma that there had been an argument. Id. Rogers testified
that Larsen had mentioned something about trying to put a card in the house, and that there
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actually was a card laying on the floor. Id. Rogers testified that, at that point, they decided
they would arrest Larsen. Id, Rogers testified that Larsen refused to go with Rogers but
would walk with Woodard to the patrol car, so Woodard took him down. Id.
F.

George Larsen's Testimony

Larsen stated that Judge Manley had verbally restrained Hudyma from seeing Larsen,
but that thirty (30) seconds after the court, Hudyma walked out and went with Larsen to see
Sarah, her daughter. Tr. at p. 62. Larsen stated that he told Hudyma that she could not do
that. Id. Larsen stated that Hudyma told him that the only way she could get her child back
was to get a restraining order, that she had applied for one, and that she was not able to
obtain one because there had been no threats. Id. Larsen stated that on the night of the
incident, he had gone to Hudyma's residence to give her the card to tell her he was leaving
so that she could get her life in order and get her daughter back. Id. Larsen stated that his
only intention in going over there had been to leave the card. Id. Larsen stated that he did
not threaten or hurt Hudyma in any way, and that he had not meant to cause problems. Id.
Larsen stated that he had thought it was the right thing to do so Hudyma could get her
daughter back. Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In order to challenge a court's factual findings, "'an appellant must first marshal all
the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court
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below."'Chen v. Stewart 2004 UT 82, f76, 100 P.3d 1177, (Utah 2004), citing Wilson
Supply v. Fradan Mfg. Corp. 2002 UT 94 at ^ 21, 54 P.3d 1177. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6106 sets forth the elements of Criminal Mischief as follows:
(2) A person commits criminal mischief if the person:
(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, damages or destroys property
with the intention of defrauding an insurer;
(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property of another and as
a result:
(i) recklessly endangers:
(A) human life; or
(B) human health or safety; or
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial interruption or impairment of
any critical infrastructure;
(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another; or
(d) recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile or other object at or
against a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, train, railway car, or
caboose, whether moving or standing.
(3) (a) (i) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a third degree felony,
(ii) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(i)(A) is a class A misdemeanor,
(iii) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(i)(B) is a class B misdemeanor,
(iv) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(ii) is a second degree felony.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§76-6-206 sets forth the elements of criminal trespass as follows:

(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not
amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204
or a violation of Section 76-10-2402 regarding commercial terrorism:
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and:
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any
property, including the use of graffiti as defined in Section 76-6-107;
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of another;
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains on property
as to which notice against entering is given by:
(i) personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone with
apparent authority to act for the owner;
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders; or
18

(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders; or
(c) he enters a condominium unit in violation of Subsection 57-8-7(7).
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) or (b) is a class B misdemeanor unless
it was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a class A misdemeanor.
In the instant matter, insufficient evidence exists to show that Larsen met the elements
that are necessary to be convicted of Criminal Mischief and Criminal Trespass. The State
failed to meet their burden of proving the elements of UTAH CODE ANN. §§76-6-106 and 206. Larsen also had a possessory interest in the property, negating the element of each crime
charged that Larsen's actions were unlawful in this matter. Therefore, the convictions of
Larsen for criminal mischief and trespass cannot stand.
ARGUMENT
I. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO SUPPORT THE ELEMENTS FOR A
CONVICTION OF CRIMINAL MISCHIEF
No person accused in the United States may be convicted of a crime unless each
element of the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 362, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (emphasis added). The United States
Supreme Court has assigned this standard of proof constitutional status, linking it to both the
Fifth Amendment right to due process of law and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
Sullivan V.Louisiana. 508 U.S. 275,278 (1993); Winship. 397 U.S. at 362,364. "[T]he Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."
Winship. 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. at 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).
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In order to challenge a court's factual findings, 'an appellant must first marshal all the
evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court
below.'"Chen v. Stewart 2004 UT 82, ^76, 100 P.3d 1177, (Utah 2004), citing Wilson
Supply v. Fradan Mfg. Corp. 2002 UT 94 at U 21, 54 P.3d 1177.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§76-6-106 sets forth the elements of criminal mischief as follows:

(2) A person commits criminal mischief if the person:
(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, damages or destroys property
with the intention of defrauding an insurer;
(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property of another and as
a result:
(i) recklessly endangers:
(A) human life; or
(B) human health or safety; or
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial interruption or impairment of
any critical infrastructure;
(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another, or
(d) recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile or other object at or
against a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, train, railway car, or
caboose, whether moving or standing.
(3) (a) (i) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a third degree felony,
(ii) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(i)(A) is a class A misdemeanor,
(iii) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(i)(B) is a class B misdemeanor,
(iv) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(ii) is a second degree felony.
(Emphasis added). "Possessory interest'' is defined as, "the right to exert control over
specific land to the exclusion of others, coupled with the intent to exercise that right." Gilbert
Law Summaries, Pocket Size Law Dictionary, pp. 249. The Colorado Supreme Court
provides helpful insight by stating that, "[t]he definition of property 'of another,' .. .states
'[p]roperty is that of "another" if anyone other than the defendant has possessory or
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proprietary interest therein.'" People v. Clayton. 728 P.2d 723, 726 (Colo. 1986). Similarly,
this Court has determined that, "Model Penal Code § 223.0(7) defines 'property of another'
to include 'property in which any person other than the actor has an interest which the actor
is not privileged to infringe, regardless of the fact that the actor also has an interest in the
property.'" State v. Larsen. 834 P.2d 586, 591, fn. 2 (Utah App. 1992).
As is stated supra, in order for a person to be convicted on a charge of criminal
mischief the person must intentionally or unlawfully tamper with the property of another and
the result must recklessly endanger a human life or human health or safety or the person must
intentionally damage, deface, or destroy the property of another. In this matter, insufficient
evidence has been presented to met these elements.
Tamela Hudyma, who was the girlfriend of Larsen at the time of the incident, testified
that when Larsen came to the door, she was talking to her daughter on the phone. Tr. at p.
7. Hudyma testified that she told her daughter that Larsen was at the door, so she would have
to hang up and call the police department. Id. Hudyma testified that she did not remember
whether Larsen had banged, knocked, or yelled to alert her that he was at the door, but she
knew it was Larsen when she saw him through the peephole. Id. Hudyma testified that she
called the police and then Larsen pushed in the door and threw down a card. Tr. at p. 8.
Hudyma testified that the door had been previously damaged, and that it was further damaged
by Larsen when he pushed it in. Id, Hudyma testified that she then heard somebody on the
stairs, and Larsen came back up and she told him that she had the No-Contact Order and that
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she had called the police department. Id. Hudyma testified that when the officers showed
up, she and Larsen were in her bathroom. Tr. At p. 9. Hudyma testified that she did not
recall any yelling and screaming between her and Larsen when the officers arrived. Id.
Hudyma testified that her door had been cracked prior to the night in question. Tr. at p. 21.
Hudyma testified that she thought, because of the door's splitting, that the door is hollow and
has a wooden core with a metal shell, and that in the summer the door would swell badly,
causing it to stick. Id. Hudyma testified that the photos of the door in State's Exhibit No.
1 show both damage that had occurred prior to the night in question, as well as the damage
done by Larsen. Id. Hudyma testified that the door had been taped because of the crack in
the swelling. Id. Hudyma testified that she did not know if the police had removed the tape
prior to taking the picture. Tr. at p. 21-22. Hudyma testified that there was still tape on the
door when she came out of the bathroom after the police arrived. Tr. at p. 22. Hudyma
testified that said tape was visible in the photographs in State's Exhibit No. 1, and that she
did not know whether any tape had been removed. Id.
Hudyma testified that she was not afraid for her physical safety. Tr. At p. 18-19. The
State attempted to prove that Larsen damaged the door by kicking in the door in anger,
however, the testimony by the Hudyma reflects that she herself knew that the door had been
damaged prior to the incident in question. The officers also testified as to the damage of the
door, and noticing the tape already on the door. Woodard testified that he and Rogers were
the very first two to arrive on the scene. Tr. at p. 38. Woodard testified that when they came
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up the stairs, they saw no one; the door, which was damaged, was open, and they announced
who they were and went in. Tr. at p. 33-34. Woodard testified that they could hear arguing
and that he recognized Larsen's voice, which was agitated. Tr. at p. 34.
Officer Lambert testified that he that he went back upstairs, stood up there, got a
statement from Hudyma, and took the pictures of the broken door identified as State's
Exhibit No. One (1). Id. Lambert testified that the photographs fairly and accurately
represent what the door looked like on the night in question. Tr. at p. 44.
Insufficient evidence exists to support the fact the Larsen intentionally damaged the
property of Hudyma during the incident at issue herein. First, testimony was offered Hudyma
herself that she informed the officers that the door had been damaged previously and that
tape had been placed on the door because of that damage. Hudyma had testified that the door
was cracked and in the summer time would swell badly and this is why she had placed tape
upon the door. Other than Hudyma testifying that she thought Larsen might have further
damaged the door when he pushed the door in, no evidence was presented to show that
Larsen intentionally pushed the door open with the intent to damage it. Hudyma additionally
testified that the door could be opened without a key or much effort, evidencing that force
was unnecessary.
At trial Larsen himself stated to the trial court at trial that on the night of the incident,
he had gone to Hudyma's residence to give her the card to tell her he was leaving so that she
could get her life in order and get her daughter back. Tr. at p. 62. Larsen stated that his only
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intention in going over there had been to leave the card. Id. Therefore, no evidence has been
presented to show that Larsen had the necessary requisite intent to cause damage to the
property of Hudyma. In fact, Larsen could not have the intent to damage Hudyma's property
because he had a possessory interest in the property and he could not be charged with
damaging his own property.
Hudyma testified that Larsen had never lived in her home, but that she had lived with
him in his home. Tr. at p. 19. Hudyma testified that the last time that she and Larsen had
lived together was in February of 2006. Id. Hudyma testified that Larsen still had some of
his personal possessions in her home, including his fish tank and a pet Bearded Dragon that
was originally supposed to belong to Hudyma's daughter, and for which they had all
contributed funds. Id. Hudyma testified that Larsen had kept some of his movies as well as
some of his clothes in her home at times when she was doing his laundry. Tr. at p. 20.
Hudyma testified that Larsen had occasionally spent the night at her home in the past, but,
more often, she would go to his house to spend the night. Id. Hudyma testified that at one
time Larsen had a key to her home, but that on the night in question, he did not have a key,
and that because she had problems with the locks, nobody used a key. Tr. at p. 20-21.
It is clearly evident that Larsen's possessions were on the property in the form of
everyday-type items such as living necessities and entertainment, and that he had spent the
night on several occasions. When coupled with the fact that Larsen had a key to the property,
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it is clear that Larsen had a possessory interest in the property as a cohabitant of Hudyma's.
Thus it is impossible for Larsen to be charged with damaging his own property.
One cannot criminally damage property that they maintain a possessory interest in.
As a result, Larsen cannot be found guilty of criminal mischief because the elements pursuant
to Utah law have not been met and the testimony given at trial proves that Larsen had
belongings and possessions on the property and that he was given a key to the property.
Because Larsen had a possessory interest in the property, did not have the necessary requisite
intent to damage the property and the evidence was inconclusive to show that Larsen actually
caused further damage to the door, the evidence is insufficient to sustain Larsen's conviction
for criminal mischief based upon intentional damage done to the property of another.
The other element required for the crime of criminal mischief to have occurred was
that there must be the intent to harm the health or safety of a person. It is not undisputed in
this case that there was in fact a no-contact order issued between Larsen and Hudyma.
However, the reasons for said No-Contact Order are not those of health and safely. Hudyma
testified that on said date, though she had been given a No-Contact Order from Judge Manley
prohibiting her from contacting Larsen, Larsen came to the door. Id. Hudyma testified that
she understood she could not have contact with Larsen so she called the police. Id.
Hudyma testified that when Larsen came to the door, she was talking to her daughter
on the phone. Tr. at p. 7. Hudyma testified that she told her daughter that Larsen was at the
door, so she would have to hang up and call the police department. Id. Hudyma testified that
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she got a protective order the next day. Id. Hudyma testified that though she was not afraid
of Larsen, she was fearful of what Larsen might do next in his desperation of wanting to talk
to her. Id. Hudyma testified that she thought it was best to get a protective order because she
continued to get in trouble in the juvenile matter. Id. Hudyma testified that she had not
necessarily stated in the protective order that she was afraid. Tr. at p. 11. Hudyma testified
that she obtained the protective order because she thought it would eliminate any confusion
as to who could talk to who and when. Id. Hudyma testified that the State's Exhibit No. 2
was her protective order, that she had made the statement therein, and that she had sworn to
it Tr. at pp. 12, 14. After reading the protective order silently to herself, Hudyma testified
that reading it had refreshed her memory, and that, as the protective order said, she had been
fearful for herself and for Larsen because she didn't want either of them to get into any
further trouble for trying to talk to the other. Tr. at pp. 12-13. Hudyma testified that she was
afraid of what might happen in the future if this was not resolved. Tr. at p. 13.
By Hudyma's own admission, she was not fearful of Larsen and, in fact, she got the
No-Contact Order for the purpose of getting her child back in the other pending action
against her. She was afraid of the consequences of having contact with Larsen because it
could risk the outcome of the other action against her. It was not obtained by her because she
felt her health and safety were at risk. Hudyma was not afraid for her health and safety, but
afraid for the consequences that could occur if she continued to talk to Larsen, this is why
she obtained a protective order so that she could work towards getting custody of her
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daughter back and not get into further trouble by communicating with Larsen. She was not
fearful of Larsen hurting her. Therefore, the element of intent to harm the health or safety
of Hudyma has not been met. Having not presented sufficient evidence to meet the elements
of criminal mischief beyond a reasonable doubt, Larsen's conviction for such should be
overturned.
II. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION OF
CRIMINAL TRESPASS
UTAH CODE ANN.

§76-6-206 defines criminal trespass as follows:

(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not
amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204
or a violation of Section 76-10-2402 regarding commercial terrorism:
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and:
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any
property, including the use of graffiti as defined in Section 76-6-107;
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of another;
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains on property
as to which notice against entering is given by:
(i) personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone with
apparent authority to act for the owner;
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders; or
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders; or
(c) he enters a condominium unit in violation of Subsection 57-8-7(7).
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) or (b) is a class B misdemeanor unless
it was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a class A misdemeanor.
(Emphasis added). In a defense based upon possessory interest as it pertains to the charge
of criminal trespass, the Utah Supreme Court has upheld the charge when the prosecution has
produced substantial evidence supporting the unlawful presence on the property. State v.
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f37, 70 P.3d 111. Such evidence included documentation as to the
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possession of the property such as tax deed, quiet title judgments, writ of restitution,
defendant's prior trespass convictions, and testimony that defendant did not have permission
to be on the land. Id. As shown further below, none of this type of evidence was presented
in this matter.
In order for Larsen to have been convicted of criminal trespass, the evidence must
show that Larsen remained unlawfully on the property. No evidence has been presented that
shows that Larsen entered or remained unlawfully on the property. First, Hudyma let Larsen
into the residence on the night of the incident. She testified that she did not remember
whether Larsen had banged, knocked, or yelled to alert her that he was at the door, but she
knew it was Larsen when she saw him through the peephole. Tr. at p. 7. Also no evidence
was presented to show that Hudyma ever asked Larsen to leave, allowing him to remain on
the property. Second, as argued supra Larsen has possessory interest in the property.
Hudyma testified that Larsen had never lived in her home, but that she had lived with him
in his home. Tr. at p. 19. Hudyma testified that the last time that she and Larsen had lived
together was in February of 2006. Id. Hudyma testified that Larsen still had some of his
personal possessions in her home, including his fish tank and a pet Bearded Dragon that was
originally supposed to belong to Hudyma's daughter, and for which they had all contributed
funds. Id. Hudyma testified that Larsen had kept some of his movies as well as some of his
clothes in her home at times when she was doing his laundry. Tr. at p. 20. Hudyma testified
that Larsen had occasionally spent the night at her home in the past, but, more often, she
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would go to his house to spend the night. Id. Hudyma testified that at one time Larsen had
a key to her home, but that on the night in question, he did not have a key, and that because
she had problems with the locks, nobody used a key. Tr. at p. 20-21.
The State failed to present documentary evidence that the residence belonged to
Hudyma and the testimony presented by Hudyma evidences that she allowed him to be on
the property at the time of the alleged incident herein. Additionally, Hudyma did not offer
any testimony that Larsen was not allowed to be on the property. As argued supra, the
possessions he maintained on the property evidence that he was a co-habitant with possessory
interest in the property itself.
One cannot trespass on property that they maintain a possessory interest in. As a
result, Larsen cannot be found guilty of criminal trespass because the State failed to meet the
requisite elements pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-206 and the testimony and evidence
provided proves that his belongings and possessions were present on the property and that
he was given a key to location. Therefore, because insufficient evidence was presented to
show that Larsen entered or remained unlawfully on the property that he had a possessory
interest in and that he was admitted onto by Hudyma, Larsen's conviction for criminal
trespass cannot stand.
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CONCLUSION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, Larsen respectfully requests that this Court
overturn the Judgment and enter other such orders as this Court deems appropriate.
DATED this 9th day of July 2007.

William L. Schultz
Attorney for George Larsen
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 9th day of July, 2007,1 mailed, first class postage prepaid,
true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to:
Happy J. Morgan
Grand County Attorney
125 East Center
Moab, Utah 84532
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